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Abstract
We show by counterexample that policy-gradient algorithms have no guarantees of even local
convergence to Nash equilibria in continuous action and state space multi-agent settings. To do
so, we analyze gradient-play in N–player general-sum linear quadratic games. In such games
the state and action spaces are continuous and the unique global Nash equilibrium can be found
be solving coupled Ricatti equations. Further, gradient-play in LQ games is equivalent to multi-
agent policy gradient. We first prove that the only critical point of the gradient dynamics in these
games is the unique global Nash equilibrium. We then give sufficient conditions under which
policy gradient will avoid the Nash equilibrium, and generate a large number of general-sum linear
quadratic games that satisfy these conditions. The existence of such games indicates that one of the
most popular approaches to solving reinforcement learning problems in the classic reinforcement
learning setting has no guarantee of convergence in multi-agent settings. Further, the ease with
which we can generate these counterexamples suggests that such situations are not mere edge cases
and are in fact quite common.
1. Introduction
Interest in multi-agent reinforcement learning has seen a recent surge of late, and policy gradient
algorithms are championed due to their potential scalability. Indeed, recent impressive successes of
multi-agent reinforcement learning have made use of policy optimization algorithms such as multi-
agent actor-critic (Lowe et al., 2017; Srinivasan et al., 2018; Jaderberg et al., 2019), multi-agent
proximal policy optimization (Bansal et al., 2018), and even simple multi-agent policy gradients
(Lanctot et al., 2017) in problems where the various agents have continuous state and action spaces.
Despite these successes, a theoretical understanding of these algorithms in multi-agent settings
is still lacking. Missing perhaps, is a tractable yet sufficiently complex setting in which to study
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these algorithms. Recently, there has been much interest in analyzing the convergence and sample
complexity of policy-gradient algorithms in the classic linear quadratic regulator (LQR) problem
from optimal control (Kalman, 1960). The LQR problem is a particularly apt setting to study the
properties of reinforcement learning algorithms due to the existence of an optimal policy which is a
linear function of the state and which can be found by solving a Ricatti equation. Indeed, the relative
simplicity of the problem has allowed for new insights into the behavior of reinforcement learning
algorithms in continuous action and state spaces (Dean et al., 2017; Fazel et al., 2018; Malik et al.,
2019).
An extension of the LQR problem to the setting with multiple agents, known as a linear quadratic
(LQ) game, has also been well studied in the literature on dynamic games and optimal control (Basar
and Olsder, 1998). As the name suggests, an LQ game is a setting in which multiple agents attempt
to optimally control a shared linear dynamical system subject to quadratic costs. Since the players
have their own costs, the notion of ‘optimality’ in such games is a Nash equilibrium.
Like LQR for the classical single-agent setting, LQ games are an appealing setting in which
to analyze the behavior of multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms in continuous action and
state spaces since they admit a unique global Nash equilibrium in the space of linear feedback
policies. Moreover, this equilibrium can be found by solving a coupled set of Ricatti equations.
As such, LQ games are a natural benchmark problem on which to test policy-gradient algorithms
in multi-agent settings. In the single-agent setting, it was recently shown that policy gradient has
global convergence guarantees for the LQR problem (Fazel et al., 2018). These results have recently
been extended to projected policy-gradient algorithms in zero-sum LQ games (Zhang et al., 2019).
Contributions. We present a negative result, showing that policy gradient in general-sum LQ
games does not enjoy even local convergence guarantees, unlike in LQR and zero-sum LQ games.
In particular, we show that if each player randomly initializes their policy and then uses a policy-
gradient algorithm there exists an LQ game in which the players would almost surely fail to con-
verge to any single set of policies (including the unique Nash equilibrium). Further, our numerical
experiments indicate that LQ games in which this occurs may be quite common. We also observe
empirically that when players fail to converge to the Nash equilibrium they do converge to sta-
ble limit cycles. These cycles do not seem to have any readily apparent relationship to the Nash
equilibrium of the game.
Organization. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the setting of N -
player general-sum LQ games and present previous results on the existence and uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium in such games. We show in Section 3 that policy gradient in the general class
of LQ games that admit a unique feedback Nash equilibrium has no other stationary points than
the Nash equilibrium. In Section 4, we give sufficient conditions under which policy gradient will
almost surely avoid the Nash equilibrium. Given these theoretical results, we perform a random
search and find a large number of 2-player LQ games that satisfy these sufficient conditions. These
findings are presented in Section 5. We also present numerical experiments showing the existence
of limit cycles in the gradient dynamics of general-sum LQ games. We conclude in Section 6 with
a discussion of our findings.
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2. Preliminaries
We consider N -player LQ games subject to a discrete-time dynamical system defined by
z(t+ 1) = Az(t) +
∑N
i=1Biui(t) z(0) = z0 ∼ Do, (1)
where z(t) ∈ Rm is the state at time t, Do is the initial state distribution, and ui(t) ∈ Rdi is the
control input of player i ∈ 1, . . . , N . For LQ games, it is known that under reasonable assumptions,
linear feedback policies for each player that constitute a Nash equilibrium exist and are unique
(Basar and Olsder, 1998). Thus, we consider that each player i searches for a linear feedback policy
of the form ui(t) = −Kiz(t) that minimizes their loss, where Ki ∈ Rdi×m. We use the notation
d =
∑N
i=1 di for the combined dimension of the players’ parameterized policies.
As the name of the game implies, the players’ loss functions are quadratic functions given by
fi(u1, . . . , uN ) = Ez0∼Do
[∑∞
t=0 z(t)
TQiz(t) + ui(t)
TRiui(t)
]
,
where Qi and Ri are the cost matrices for the state and input, respectively.
Assumption 1 For each player i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, the state and control cost matrices satisfy Qi  0
and Ri  0.
We note that the players are coupled through the dynamics since z(t) is constrained to obey
the update equation given in (1). We focus on a setting in which all players randomly initialize
their strategy and then perform gradient descent simultaneously on their own cost functions with
respect to their individual control inputs. That is, the players use policy-gradient algorithms of the
following form:
Ki,n+1 = Ki,n − γiDifi(K1,n, . . . ,KN,n) (2)
where Difi(·, ·) denotes the derivatives of fi with respect to the i–th argument, and {γi}Ni=1 are the
step-sizes of the players. We note that there is a slight abuse of notation here in the expression of
Difi as functions of the parameters Ki as opposed to the control inputs ui. To ensure there is no
confusion between t and n, we also point out that n indexes the policy gradient algorithm iterations
while t indexes the time of the dynamical system.
To simplify notation, define
ΣK = Ez0∼Do
[∑∞
t=0 z(t)z(t)
T
]
,
where we use the subscript notation to denote the dependence on the collection of controllers K =
(K1, . . . ,KN ). Define also the initial state covariance matrix
Σ0 = Ez0∼Doz(0)z(0)T .
Direct computation verifies that for player i, Difi is given by:
Difi(K1, . . . ,KN ) = 2(RiKi −BTi PiA¯)ΣK , (3)
where A¯ = A−∑Ni=1BiKi, is the closed–loop dynamics given all players’ control inputs and, for
given (K1, . . . ,KN ), the matrix Pi is the unique positive definite solution to the Bellman equation
defined as
Pi = A¯
TPiA¯+K
T
i RiKi +Qi, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (4)
Given that the players may have different control objectives and do not engage in coordination
or cooperation, the best they can hope to achieve is a Nash equilibrium.
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Definition 1 A feedback Nash equilibrium is a collection of policies (K∗1 , . . . ,K∗N ) such that:
fi(K
∗
1 , . . . ,K
∗
i , . . . ,K
∗
N ) ≤ fi(K∗1 , . . . ,Ki, . . . ,K∗N ), ∀Ki ∈ Rdi×m.
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Under suitable assumptions on the cost matrices, the Nash equilibrium of an LQ game is known to
exist and is unique in the space of linear policies Basar and Olsder (1998). It can be found by solving
coupled Ricatti equations using the method of Lyapunov iterations; e.g., the method is outlined in
Li and Gajic (1995) for continuous time LQ games, and an analogous procedure can be followed
for discrete time. Convergence requires the following assumption.
Assumption 2 For at least one player i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (A,Bi) is stabilizable.
Assumption 2 is a necessary condition for the players to be able to stabilize the system. Indeed,
the player’s costs are finite only if the closed loop system A¯ is asymptotically stable, meaning that
|Re(λ)| < 1 for all λ ∈ spec(A¯), where Re(λ) denotes the real part of λ and spec(M) is the
spectrum of a matrix M .
3. Uniqueness of Critical Points of the Gradient Dynamics in General-Sum LQ
Games
Having introduced the class of games we analyze we now comment on the critical points of gradient-
play in general LQ games. Letting x = (K1, . . . ,KN ), the object of interest is the map ω : Rmd →
Rmd defined as follows:
ω(x) =
 D1f1(K1, . . . ,KN )...
DNfN (K1, . . . ,KN )
 .
Note that Difi = ∂fi/∂Ki has been converted to an mdi dimensional vector and each Ki has also
been vectorized. This is a slight abuse of notation and throughout we treat the Ki’s as both vectors
and matrices; in general, the shape should be clear from context, and otherwise we make comments
where necessary to clarify.
Critical points of gradient-play are strategies x = (K1, . . . ,KN ) such that ω(x) = 0. Recent
work has shown that when players perform gradient descent on their own cost functions in general-
sum games they may converge to critical points that are not Nash equilibria (Mazumdar et al., 2018).
The following theorem shows that such non-Nash equilibria cannot exist in the gradient dynamics
of general-sum LQ games.
Theorem 2 Consider the set of stabilizing policies x∗ = (K∗1 , . . . ,K∗N ) such that ΣK∗ > 0. If
Difi(K
∗
1 , . . . ,K
∗
N ) = 0 for each i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, then x∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof We prove the statement by contradiction. Suppose the claim does not hold so that ΣK∗ > 0
andDifi(K∗1 , . . . ,K∗N ) = 0 for each i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, yet (K∗1 , . . . ,K∗N ) is not a Nash equilibrium.
That is, without loss of generality, there exists a K¯1 such that:
f1(K¯1,K
∗
2 , . . . ,K
∗
N ) < f1(K
∗
1 , . . . ,K
∗
N ).
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Now, fixing (K∗2 , . . . ,K∗N ), player 1 can be seen as facing an LQR problem. Indeed, letting
(K∗2 , . . . ,K∗N ) be fixed, player 1 aims to find a ‘best response’ in the space of linear feedback
policies of the form u1(t) = Kz(t) with K ∈ Rdi×m that minimizes f1(·,K∗2 , . . . ,K∗N ) subject to
the dynamics defined by:
z(t+ 1) =
(
A−∑Ni=2BiKi) z(t) +B1u1(t).
Note that this system is necessarily stabilizable since A¯ is stable. Hence, the discrete algebraic
Riccati equation for player 1’s LQR problem has a positive definite solution P such that R1 +
BT1 PB1 > 0 since R1 > 0 by assumption. Since ΣK∗ > 0 and D1f1(K
∗
1 , . . . ,K
∗
N ) = 0, applying
Corollary 4 of Fazel et al. (2018), we have that K∗1 must be optimal for player 1’s LQR problem so
that
f1(K
∗
1 , . . . ,K
∗
N ) ≤ f1(K,K∗2 , . . . ,K∗N ), ∀K ∈ Rd1×m.
In particular, the above inequality holds for K¯1, which leads to a contradiction.
Theorem 2 shows that, just as in the single-player LQR setting and zero-sum LQ games, the
critical points of gradient-play in N–player general-sum LQ games are all Nash equilibria. We
note that the condition ΣK > 0 can be satisfied by choosing an initial state distribution Do with a
full-rank covariance matrix.
A simple consequence of Theorem 2 and the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium given Assump-
tions 1 and 2 is that the gradient dynamics admit a unique critical point.
Corollary 3 Under Assumption 1 and 2, if Σ0 = Ez0∼D0 [z0zT0 ]  0, then the map ω admits a
unique critical point.
Given that the unique critical point of the gradient dynamics in LQ games is the Nash equilib-
rium, the aim is to show, via constructing an example, that games in which the gradient dynamics
avoid the Nash equilibrium do in fact exist. A sufficient condition for this would be to find a
game in which gradient-play diverges from neighborhoods of Nash equilibria. It is demonstrated in
Mazumdar et al. (2018) that there may be Nash equilibria that are not even locally attracting under
the gradient dynamics in N–player general-sum games in which the players’ costs are sufficiently
smooth (i.e., at least twice continuously differentiable). In games that admit such Nash equilib-
ria, the agents could initialize arbitrarily close to the Nash equilibrium, simultaneously perform
individual gradient descent with arbitrarily small step sizes, and still diverge.
The class of N–player LQ games we consider does not, however, satisfy the smoothness as-
sumptions necessary to simply invoke the results in Mazumdar et al. (2018). Indeed, the cost
functions are non-smooth and, in fact, are infinite whenever the players have strategies that do
not stabilize the dynamics. Further, the set of stabilizing policies for a dynamical system is not
even convex (Fazel et al., 2018). Despite these challenges, in the sequel we show that the negative
convergence results in Mazumdar et al. (2018) extend to the general-sum LQ setting. In particular,
we show that even with arbitrarily small step sizes, players using policy gradient in LQ games may
still diverge from neighborhoods of the unique Nash equilibrium.
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4. Policy Gradient Avoids Nash Equilibria that are Saddle Points of the Dynamics
Given that the Nash equilibrium is the unique critical point of the gradient dynamics in N–player
LQ games, we now give sufficient conditions under which gradient-play has no guarantees of even
local, much less global, convergence to a critical point. Towards this end, we first show that ω is
sufficiently smooth on the set of stabilizing policies.
Let Smd ⊂ Rmd be the subset of stabilizing md–dimensional matrices.
Proposition 4 Consider an N–player LQ game. The vector-valued map ω associated with the
game is twice continuously differentiable on Smd—i.e., ω ∈ C2(Smd,Smd).
Using our notation, Lemma 6.5 in Zhang et al. (2019) shows for two-player zero-sum LQ games
that (P1, P2), and ΣK are continuously differentiable with respect toK1 andK2 whenA−B1K1−
B2K2 is stable. This, in turn, implies that ω(K1,K2) is continuously differentiable with respect
to K1 and K2 when the closed loop system A − B1K1 − B2K2 is stable. The result follows by a
straightforward application of the implicit function theorem (Abraham et al., 1988). We utilize the
same proof technique here in extending the result to N–player general-sum LQ games and, in fact,
the proof implies that ω has even stronger regularity properties. Since the proof follows the same
techniques as in Zhang et al. (2019), we defer it to Appendix A.
Given that ω is continuously differentiable over the set of stabilizing joint policies (K1, . . . ,KN ),
the following result gives sufficient conditions such that the set of initial conditions in a neighbor-
hood of the Nash equilibrium from which gradient-play converges to the Nash equilibrium is of
measure zero. This implies that the players will almost surely avoid the Nash equilibrium even if
they randomly initialize in a uniformly small ball around it.
Let the Jacobian of the vector field ω be denoted by Dω. Given a critical point x∗, let λj be
the eigenvalues of Dω(x∗), for j ∈ {1, . . . ,md}, where d = ∑ni=1 di. Recall that the state z(t) is
dimension m.
Theorem 5 Suppose that Σ0 > 0. Consider anyN–player LQ game satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2
that admits a unique Nash equilibrium that is a saddle point of the policy gradient dynamics—i.e.,
LQ games for which the Jacobian of ω evaluated at the unique Nash equilibrium x∗ = (K∗1 , . . . ,K∗N )
has eigenvalues λj such that Re(λj) < 0 for j ∈ {1, . . . , `} and Re(λj) > 0 for j ∈ {` +
1, . . . ,md} for some ` such that 0 < ` < md. Then there exists a neighborhood U of x∗ such that
policy gradient converges on a set of measure zero.
Proof The proof is made up of three parts: (i) we show the existence of an open-convex neigh-
borhood U of x∗ on which ω is locally Lipschitz with constant L; (ii) we show that the map
g(x) = x − Γω(x) is a diffeomorphism on U ; and, (iii) we invoke the stable manifold theorem
to show that the set of initializations in U on which policy gradient converges is measure zero.
(i) ω is locally Lipschitz. Proposition 4 shows that ω is continuously differentiable on the set of
stabilizing policies Smd. Given Assumptions 1 and 2, the Nash equilibrium exists and x∗ ∈ Smd.
Thus, there must exist an open convex neighborhood U of x∗ such that ||Dω||2 < L for some
L > 0.
(ii) g is a diffeomorphism. By the preceding argument, ω is locally Lipschitz on U with Lipschitz
constant L. Consider the policy gradient algorithm with γi < 1/L for each i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Let
Γ = diag(Γ1, . . . ,ΓN ) where Γi = diag((γi)
mdi
j=1)—that is, Γi is an mdi × mdi diagonal matrix
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with γi repeated on the diagonal mdi times. Now, we claim the mapping g : Rmd → Rmd :
x 7→ x − Γω(x) is a diffeomorphism on U . If we can show that g is invertible on U and a local
diffeomorphism, then the claim follows. Let us first prove that g is invertible.
Consider x 6= y and suppose g(y) = g(x) so that y − x = γ · (ω(y) − ω(x)). Since ‖ω(y) −
ω(x)‖2 ≤ L‖y−x‖2 on U , ‖x−y‖2 ≤ L‖Γ‖2‖y−x‖2 < ‖y−x‖2 since ‖Γ‖2 = maxi |γi| < 1/L.
Now, observe that Dg = I − ΓDω(x). If Dg is invertible, then the implicit function theo-
rem (Abraham et al., 1988) implies that g is a local diffeomorphism. Hence, it suffices to show that
ΓDω(x) does not have an eigenvalue equal to one. Indeed, letting ρ(A) be the spectral radius of a
matrix A, we know in general that ρ(A) ≤ ‖A‖ for any square matrix A and induced operator norm
‖ · ‖ so that ρ(ΓDω(x)) ≤ ‖ΓDω(x)‖2 ≤ ‖Γ‖2 supx∈U ‖Dω(x)‖2 < maxi |γi|L < 1. Of course,
the spectral radius is the maximum absolute value of the eigenvalues, so that the above implies that
all eigenvalues of ΓDω(x)) have absolute value less than one.
Since g is injective by the preceding argument, its inverse is well-defined and since g is a local
diffeomorphism on U , it follows that g−1 is smooth on U . Thus, g is a diffeomorphism.
(iii) Local convergence occurs on a set of measure zero. By Corollary 3, x∗ is unique. Let B be
the open ball derived from Theorem 5 in Appendix B.
Starting from x0 ∈ U , if gradient-based learning converges to a strict saddle point, then there
exists an n0 such that gn(x0) ∈ B for all n ≥ n0. Applying Theorem 5 (Appendix B), we get
that gn(x0) ∈ W csloc ∩ B. Now, using the fact that g is invertible, we can iteratively construct the
sequence of sets defined byW1(x∗) = g−1(W csloc∩B)∩U andWk+1(x∗) = g−1(Wk(x∗)∩B)∩U .
Then we have that x0 ∈ Wn(x∗) for all n ≥ n0. The set U0 = ∪∞k=1Wk(x∗) contains all the initial
points in U such that gradient-based learning converges to a strict saddle.
Since x∗ is a strict saddle, I − ΓDω(x∗) has an eigenvalue greater than one. This implies that
the co-dimension of the unstable manifold is strictly less than md so that dim(W csloc) < md. Hence,
W csloc ∩B has Lebesgue measure zero in Rmd. Using again that g is a diffeomorphism, g−1 ∈ C1 so
that it is locally Lipschitz and locally Lipschitz maps are null-set preserving. Hence, Wk(x∗) has
measure zero for all k by induction so that U0 is a measure-zero set since it is a countable union of
measure-zero sets.
Theorem 5 gives sufficient conditions under which, with random initializations of Ki, policy
gradient methods would almost surely avoid the unique critical point and therefore fail to converge
to any single set of policies. Let each players’ initial strategy Ki,0 be sampled from a distribution
pi,0 for i ∈ {1, ..., N} , and let p0 be the resulting the joint distribution of (K1,0, . . . ,KN,0).
Corollary 6 Suppose Do is chosen such that Σ0  0, and consider an N–player LQ game satis-
fying Assumptions 1 and 2 in which the Nash equilibrium is a saddle point of the policy gradient
dynamics. If each player i ∈ {1, . . . , N} performs policy gradient with a random initial strategy
Ki,0 ∼ pi,0 such that the support of p0 is U , they will almost surely avoid the Nash equilibrium.
Corollary 6 shows that even if the players randomly initialize in a neighborhood of the Nash
equilibrium in a LQ game in which the Nash is a saddle point of the joint gradient dynamics they
will almost surely avoid it. The proof follows trivially from the fact that the set of initializations
that converge to the Nash equilibrium is of measure zero in U .
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In the next section, we generate a large number of LQ games that satisfy the conditions of Corol-
lary 6. Taken together, these theoretical and numerical results imply that policy-gradient algorithms
have no guarantees of local, and consequently global, convergence in general-sum LQ games.
Remark 7 Theorem 5 gives us sufficient conditions under which policy gradient in general-sum LQ
games does not even have local convergence guarantees, much less global convergence guarantees.
We remark that this is very different from the single-player LQR setting, where policy gradient will
converge from any initialization in a neighborhood of the optimal solution (Fazel et al., 2018). In
zero-sum LQ games, the structure of the game also precludes any Nash equilibrium from satisfying
the conditions of Theorem 5 (Mazumdar et al., 2018), meaning that local convergence is always
guaranteed. In Zhang et al. (2019), the guarantee of local convergence is strengthened to that of
global convergence for a class of projected policy gradient algorithms in zero-sum LQ games.
5. Generating Counterexamples
Since it is difficult to find a simple closed form for the Jacobian of ω due to the fact that the matrices
Pi implicitly depend on all the Ki, we perform random search to find instances of LQ games in
which the Nash equilibrium is a strict saddle point of the gradient dynamics. For each LQ game
we generate, we use the method of Lyapunov iterations to find the global Nash equilibrium of the
LQ game and numerically approximate the Jacobian to machine precision. We then check whether
the Nash equilibrium is a strict saddle. Surprisingly, such a simple search procedure finds a large
number of LQ games in which policy gradient avoids the unique Nash equilibrium.
For simplicity, we focus on two-player LQ games where z ∈ R2 and d1 = d2 = 1. Thus, each
player i = 1, 2 has two parameters to learn, which we denote Ki,j , j = 1, 2.
In the remainder of this section, we detail our experimental setup and then present our findings.
5.1 Experimental setup
To search for examples of LQ games in which policy gradient avoids the Nash equilibrium, we fix
B1, Q1, and R1 and parametrize B2, Q2, and R2 by b, q, and r, respectively. For various values
of the parameters b, q, and r, we uniformly sample 1000 different dynamics matrices A ∈ R2×2
such that A,B1, Q1 satisfies Assumption 2. Then, for each of the 1000 different LQ games we find
the optimal feedback matrices (K∗1 ,K∗2 ) using the method of Lyapunov iterations (i.e., a discrete
time variant of the algorithm outlined in Li and Gajic (1995)), and then numerically approximate
Dω(K∗1 ,K∗2 ) using auto-differentiation1 tools and check its eigenvalues.
The exact values of the matrices are defined as follows:
A ∈ R2×2 : ai,j ∼ Uniform(0, 1) i, j = 1, 2,
B1 =
[
1
1
]
, B2 =
[
b
1
]
, Q1 =
[
0.01 0
0 1
]
, Q2 =
[
1 0
0 q
]
, R1 = 0.01, R2 = r.
5.2 Numerical results
Using the setup outlined in the previous section we randomly generated LQ games to search for
counterexamples. We first present results that show that these counterexamples may be quite com-
1. We use auto-differentiation due to the fact that finding an analytical expression for Dω is unduly arduous even in low
dimensions due to the dependence of Pi and ΣK1,K2 on (K1,K2), both of which are implicitly defined.
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Figure 1: Frequency (out of 1000) of randomly sampled LQ games with global Nash equilibria that
are avoided by policy gradient. Each point represents, for the given parameter value, the frequency
of such games out of 1000 randomly sampled A matrices. The solid line shows the average fre-
quency of these games. (i) r is varied in (0, 1), b = 0, q = 0.01. (ii) q is varied in (0, 1), b = 0,
r = 0.1. (iii) b is varied in (−0.5, 0.5), q = 0.01, r = 0.1.
mon. We then use policy gradient in two of the LQ games we generated and highlight the existence
of limit cycles and the fact that the players’ time-averaged strategies do not converge to the Nash
equilibrium.
Avoidance of Nash in a nontrivial class of LQ games. As can be seen in Figure 1, across the
different parameter values we considered, we found that in 0% to 25% of randomly sampled LQ
games, the unique global Nash equilibrium was a strict saddle point of the gradient dynamics and
would therefore be avoided by policy gradient. Of particular interest, when b = 0, for all values of
q and r that we tested at least 5% of the LQ games had a global Nash equilibrium with the strict
saddle property. In the worst case, around 25% of the LQ games for the given values of b, q, and r
admitted such Nash equilibria.
These empirical observations imply that multi-agent policy gradient, even in the relatively
straightforward setting of linear dynamics, linear policies, and quadratic costs, would fail to con-
verge to the unique Nash equilibrium in up to one out of four such problems. This suggests that
for more complicated cost functions, policy classes, and dynamics, Nash equilibria may often be
avoided by policy gradient.
We remark that each point in Figure 1 represents the number of counterexamples found (out of
1000) for each parameter value, meaning that for r ≈ 0.35, b = 0, and q = 0.01 we were able to
consistently generate around 250 different examples of games where policy gradient almost surely
avoids the only stationary point of the dynamics.
Note also that we were unable to find any counterexamples when b was varied in (−0.5, 0.5)
and q = 0.01, r = 0.1. This suggests that depending on the structure of the dynamical system it
may be possible to give convergence guarantees.
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Figure 2: Payoffs of the two players in two general-sum LQ game where the Nash equilibrium
is avoided by the gradient dynamics. We observe empirically that in both games the two players
diverge from the local Nash equilibrium and converge to a limit cycle around the Nash equilibrium.
Convergence to Cycles. Figures 2–4 show the payoffs and parameter values of the two players
when they use policy gradient in two general-sum LQ games we identified as being counterexamples
for convergence to the Nash equilibrium.
In the two games, we initialize both players in a ball of radius 0.25 around their Nash equilibrium
strategies and let them perform policy gradient with step size 0.05. We observe that in both games
the players diverge from the Nash equilibrium and converge to limit cycles.
Figure 3: Parameter values of the two players in two general-sum LQ game where the Nash equi-
librium is avoided by the gradient dynamics. We observe empirically that in both games the two
players diverge from the local Nash equilibrium and converge to a limit cycle around the Nash
equilibrium. The dynamics for each plot are given in (5) for both (i) and (ii).
10
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For the two games in Figures 2–5, the game parameters are such that b = 0, r = 0.01, and
q = 0.147. The two A matrices are defined as follows:
(i): A =
[
0.588 0.028
0.570 0.056
]
, (ii): A =
[
0.511 0.064
0.533 0.993
]
. (5)
Figure 4: Parameter values of the two players in two general-sum LQ game where the Nash equi-
librium is avoided by the gradient dynamics. We empirically observe in both games described in
(5) that players converge to the same cycle from different initializations. Time is shown by the
progressive darkening of the players’ strategies.
The eigenvalues of the corresponding game Jacobian Dω evaluated at the Nash equilibrium are
as follows:
(i): spec(Dω(K∗1 ,K
∗
2 )) = {10.88, 2.02,−0.21,−0.06}
(ii): spec(Dω(K∗1 ,K
∗
2 )) = {9.76, 0.54,−0.01 + 0.08j,−0.01− 0.08j}.
Thus, these games do satisfy the conditions of Corollary 6 for the avoidance of Nash equilibria.
We conclude this section by noting that, as shown in Figure 5, the players’ average payoffs do not
necessarily converge to the Nash equilibrium payoffs.
6. Discussion
We have shown that in the relatively straightforward setting of N–player LQ games, agents per-
forming policy gradient have no guarantees of local, and therefore global, convergence to the unique
Nash equilibrium even if they randomly initialize their first policies in a small neighborhood of the
Nash equilibrium. Since we also showed that the Nash equilibrium is the only critical point of
the gradient dynamics, this means that, for this class of games, policy-gradient algorithms have no
guarantees of convergence to any set of stationary policies.
Since linear dynamics, quadratic costs, and linear policies are a relatively simple setup compared
to many recent deep multi-agent reinforcement learning problems (Bansal et al., 2018; Jaderberg
et al., 2019), we believe that the issues of non-convergence are likely to be present in more complex
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Figure 5: Time average parameter values of the two players in the general-sum LQ game with
dynamics given in (5). We empirically observe that in both games the players’ time average strategy
does not converge to the Nash equilibrium strategy. Time is shown by progressive darkening of the
players’ strategies.
scenarios involving more complex dynamics and parametrizations of the policies. This can be
viewed as a cautionary note, but it also suggests that the algorithms that have yielded impressive
results in multi-agent settings can be further improved by leveraging the underlying game-theoretic
structure.
We remark that we only analyzed the deterministic policy gradient setting, though the findings
extend to settings in which players construct unbiased estimates of their gradients (Sutton and Barto,
2017) and even actor-critic methods (Srinivasan et al., 2018). Indeed all of these algorithms will
suffer the same problems since they all seek to track the same limiting continuous-time dynamical
system (Mazumdar et al., 2018).
Our numerical experiments also highlight the existence of limit cycles in the policy-gradient
dynamics. Unlike in classical optimization settings in which oscillations are normally caused by the
choice of step sizes, the cycles we highlight are behaviors that can occur even with arbitrarily small
step sizes. They are a fundamental feature of learning in multi-agent settings (Mazumdar et al.,
2018). We remark that there is no obvious link between the limit cycles that arise in the gradient
dynamics of the LQ games and the Nash equilibrium of the game. Indeed, unlike with other game
dynamics in more simple games, such as the well-studied replicator dynamics in bilinear games
(Mertikopoulos et al., 2018) or multiplicative weights in rock-paper-scissors (Hommes and Ochea,
2012), the time average of the players’ strategies does not coincide with the Nash equilibrium. This
may be due to the fact that the Nash equilibrium is a saddle point of the gradient dynamics and not
simply marginally stable, though the issue warrants further investigation.
This paper highlights how algorithms developed for classical optimization or single-agent op-
timal control settings may not behave as expected in multi-agent and competitive environments.
Algorithms and approaches that have provable convergence guarantees and performance in compet-
itive settings, while retaining the scalability and ease of implementation of simple policy-gradient
methods, are therefore a crucial and promising open area of research.
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Appendix A. Proofs of Auxiliary Results
Proposition 4 Consider an N–player LQ game. The vector-valued map ω twice continuously dif-
ferentiable on Smd; i.e., ω ∈ C2(Smd,Smd).
Proof Following the proof technique of Zhang et al. (2019), we show the regularity of ω us-
ing the implicit function theorem (Abraham et al., 1988). In particular, we show that ΣK =
Ez0∼Do
[∑∞
t=0 z(t)z(t)
T
]
and Pi for i ∈ {1, . . . , N} are C1 with respect to each Ki on the space
of stabilizing matrices.
For any stabilizing (K1, . . . ,KN ), ΣK is the unique solution to the following discrete-time
Lyapunov equation:
A¯ΣKA¯
T + Σ0 = ΣK , (6)
where Σ0 = Ez0∼Do [z(0)z(0)T ] > 0 and A¯ = A −
∑N
i=1BiKi. Both sides of this expression can
be vectorized. Indeed, using the same notation as in Zhang et al. (2019), let vect(·) be the map that
vectorizes its argument and let Ψ : Rm2 × Rd1×m × · · · × RdN×m → Rm2 be defined by
Ψ(vect(ΣK),K1, . . . ,KN ) =
[
A¯⊗ A¯] · vect(ΣK) + vect(Σ0).
Then, (6) can be written as
F (vect(ΣK),K1, . . . ,KN ) = Ψ(vect(ΣK),K1, . . . ,KN )− vect(ΣK) = 0.
The map F implicitly defines ΣK . Moreover, letting I denote the appropriately sized identity
matrix, we have that
∂F (vect(ΣK),K1, . . . ,KN )
∂vectT (ΣK)
=
[
A¯⊗ A¯]− I.
For stabilizing (K1, . . . ,KN ), this matrix is an isomorphism since spec(A¯) is inside the unit circle.
Thus, using the implicit function theorem, we conclude that vect(ΣK) ∈ C1. As noted in Zhang
et al. (2019), the proof for each Pi, i ∈ {1, . . . , N} is completely analogous. Since ΣK and Pi are
C1 and ω is linear in these terms, the result of the proposition follows.
Appendix B. Additional Mathematical Preliminaries and Results
The following theorem is the celebrated center manifold theorem from geometry. We utilize it in
showing avoidance of saddle point equilibria of the dynamics.
Theorem 5 (Center and Stable Manifolds (Shub, 1978, Theorem III.7), Smale (1967)) Let x0 be
a fixed point for the Cr local diffeomorphism f : U → Rn where U ⊂ Rn is an open neighbor-
hood of x0 in Rn and r ≥ 1. Let Es ⊕ Ec ⊕ Eu be the invariant splitting of Rn into generalized
eigenspaces of Dφ(x0) corresponding to eigenvalues of absolute value less than one, equal to one,
and greater than one. To the Dφ(x0) invariant subspace Es ⊕ Ec there is an associated local φ–
invariantCr embedded discW csloc called the local stable center manifold of dimension dim(E
s⊕Ec)
and ballB around x0 such that φ(W csloc)∩B ⊂W csloc, and if φn(x) ∈ B for all n ≥ 0, then x ∈W scloc.
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